As the reverse supply chain for sustainability reasons has been attracting increasing attention, this theoretical work focuses on the governance mode of reverse logistics. It is a less explored sub-field in the reverse supply chain literature where manufacturers, distributors, and retailers have important roles in the chain governance. Manufacturers often engage professional third-party logistics (3PLs) firms to manage their products due to the complexity, variety, and trade compliance of such products. While such engagement can reduce the burden of product management for the manufacturers, the potential loss of competitive advantage or a conflict of interest can affect the manufacturers' reputation and profitability. Based on the literature as well as our initial fieldwork in several industries, we develop a research framework to explore the governance choice of manufacturers for reverse logistics, and examine the factors affecting the preference between self-governance and the outsourcing to third parties such as the 3PLs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional Supply Chain Management (SCM) is concerned with the flow of raw materials and finished goods [1] . Today, the scope for SCM in the context of environmental sustainability has extended to include the reverse flow of unsold finished goods, parts and packaging materials from the point of consumption back to the organization or to the rework / refurbishing vendors [2] . With the rise in environmental awareness, many companies have started to reduce waste, recycle, and refurbish their products for a more sustainable future. Governments in many countries are starting to develop clearer and stricter environmental regulations on issues such as the disposal of chemical waste, clean production, and carbon emissions. For example, firms in Europe are expected to "take-back" the environmentally hazardous products and packaging for recycling or reuse [3] .
Today, reverse logistics has been adopted significantly by the automotive and aerospace spare parts markets as well as the electronics and computer hardware markets. In the consumer electronics sector, refurbished computers are sold at cheaper prices by all the leading brands and the demand for such laptops seems to be growing. Many electronic and consumer durable manufacturing companies offer buy back or exchange offer for the old equipment in lieu of the customer purchasing new equipment. However, managing the reverse logistics process is as operations intensive and complex as the forward supply chain, demanding the same focus and can involve multiple logistics partners such as 3PLs. Unlike managing good parts inventory, defective spare parts require more handling and processes at the 3PL end. It has been commonly noticed that while the process demands defective parts to be returned in good condition, both the users and retailers do not pay enough attention to the handling of defective parts. Statistics suggest that defective parts suffer more damage in transit and handling than good parts.
In the automotive and aerospace industries, reverse logistics is closely linked to spare parts management or service parts logistics. In the automobile industry, the profit margin of the after-sale service is much higher than that of selling new cars, particularly for cars in the low price /high volume segments [4] . While manufacturers continue to face constant downward pressure due to the higher costs of materials, lower sales, and stiffer competition, the aftermarket business is able to maintain positive growth due to the consolidation in the market which produces economies of scale, and the fact that people are holding on to cars longer and therefore demand more replacement parts.
In the aerospace industry, the extent of outsourcing by manufacturers is as high as 80% [5] . Similarly, over 70 percent of a product's total value is created by suppliers in the automotive industry [6] . Many spare parts are with the supplier rather than the manufacturer. The management of outsourced supplies in quality control and chain coordination is a critical issue for both forward and reverse SCM [7] .
With the growing level of complexity connected to outsourcing, especially offshore outsourcing, many companies have considered and applied the option of outsourcing all or part of their reverse supply chain to 3PLs. In the aerospace industry, many manufacturers have passed the responsibility of the maintenance, repair and overhaul to an OEM or third party who specializes in the field. Service technologies have become so specialized that it makes sense to outsource to a specialist like Smart Signal, a company which makes systems that monitor the performance of plane engines to predict probable breakdowns [5] . In the automotive industry, 3PLs are also heavily involved in reverse logistics such as shipping returned products. Some manufacturers also outsource the warehousing function of their spare parts to 3PLs as in the case of Embraer in Singapore [8] . In general, 38%
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Some benefits of reverse logistics outsourcing include SCM cost reduction through leveraging on the 3PL's pooled demand as well as its professional expertise and better operational or technology infrastructure for SCM functions. The focal firms can avoid huge capital expenditures in facilities and enjoy the benefits of flexibility afforded by the 3PLs, which release them to focus on their core competencies [10] . However, research to date has not investigated reverse supply chain governance with theoretical rigor. A realistic and rigorous examination on reverse logistics governance is valuable for both academia and practice. This paper views reverse logistics outsourcing as a "buy" decision in SCM, similar to the ordinary outsourcing as a "buy" in the field of firm strategy. The make-or-buy problem is a fundamental issue in strategic management [11] , and various theories such as transaction cost economics (TCE) and resource-based view (RBV) can be applied. We propose a cost-value framework providing a comprehensive account to compare the benefits and costs of the make-or-buy decision in the context of reverse logistics so as to help the manufacturers evaluate the feasibility of reverse logistics outsourcing. This study contributes to the literature by providing a research framework on reverse logistics governance as well as practical suggestions for firms to improve on reverse supply chain collaboration and performance.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We review the outsourcing governance literature as well as some current practices. A research framework that systematically compares the relative benefits and cost of reverse logistics outsourcing versus a self-managed reverse supply chain is then presented. Four sets of propositions are presented for further empirical investigation.
II. REVIEW ON REVERSE LOGISTICS GOVERNANCE & RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
In a typical supply chain, a focal manufacturer procures from multiple suppliers and sends its products to multiple customers. Under globalization, these suppliers and customers can be located in faraway countries, and the manufacturer needs to find effective ways to manage the flow of goods along a disintegrated and dispersed supply chain. When customers decide to return the products or seek spare parts for repair, the manufacturer normally needs to coordinate with the 3PLs to ship the products or spare parts, and may further work with the suppliers if the spare parts are managed in-house. When firms outsource the management of the reverse supply chain, they can choose to outsource the logistics of its supplies or end-products, or the entire reverse supply chain of certain products. Some 3PLs help high-tech manufacturers like Dell manage the inventory and product returns. While this paper discusses the governance of the entire reverse supply chain, it can be applied to part of the chain governance also. The firm can manage the overall reverse chain by itself but outsource the governance of one section to a third party.
The manufacturer needs to consider three fundamental issues when selecting its reverse supply chain partners and the corresponding governance modes, namely, capability, past relationships, and uncertainty according to the management literature [e.g., 12, [13] [14] . Hereafter, we focus on the impact of the industry and firm characteristics, and exclude the influence of past relationships which is relationship specific.
Various theories have been used to explore these issues. For instance, TCE focuses on the effect of transaction characteristics such as uncertainty and asset specificity on the associated governance costs. It then asks how the make-or-buy decision or another hybrid governance form such as joint ventures magnifies or diminishes that effect [15] [16] . From another lens, RBV looks at the partners' technical capabilities and the potential synergies from combining the partners' resources such as reducing redundant resources and knowledge exchange resulting in new capabilities [17] [18] . In addition, scholars have applied real option theory to technology sourcing and identified two types of uncertainty with different implications on governance costs: exogenous uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty largely unaffected by the actions of the partner such as technological uncertainty, and endogenous uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty can be decreased by action of the partner [13] . While integration can reduce endogenous uncertainty, external equity collaboration is more effective in controlling exogenous uncertainty [13, 19] .
There are many studies applying these theoretical lenses to the context of outsourcing, especially supplier outsourcing, and some recent literature have made attempts in incorporating the key concerns of each body of them together such as [12] and [20] .
When applying these theoretical perspectives to reverse logistics outsourcing, we use the transaction value approach to synthesize the multiple theories created [21] . In contrast to uncertainty or time used before, transaction value is more rigorous and quantitative for general use. It is based on the premise that every governance mode comes with its own cost and value, and the manufacturer should maximize the net transaction value. Pure cost minimization may not be sufficient as the pursuit of greater joint value from collaboration may require a governance mode that is less cost efficient [21] . Similarly, as both endogenous and exogenous uncertainties exist, the manufacturer faces a trade-off between the need for administrative control and the cost of commitment [13] . While superior administrative control could minimize opportunistic cost, the associated benefits may be offset by the opportunity cost of committing aggressively to certain reverse logistics processes which may lose value after a significant change in government regulations. We thus propose above framework in Table I to study the governance issue in reverse logistics. On the horizontal level, we examine relative benefits, relative relational cost (cost due to the conflict of interest in the supply chain), and relative external cost (cost due to external uncertainties such as the cost of early commitment). On the vertical level, we examine uncertainty and capabilities, including both stand-alone capabilities and capabilities of value creation from collaboration. We envision that this framework can aid in achieving a better understanding of the preferences of companies in the governance of their reverse logistics.
III. THEORY & PROPOSITIONS
Applying above framework into the context of reverse logistics and considering the industry and firm characteristics, we are going to develop five groups of propositions in the following sub-sections.
A. Sectoral Differences in the Preferences for Selfgovernance and Outsourcing
The literature on the modes of organization suggests a sector-specific understanding of the association between, on the one hand, the level of technological change in the sectors of industry, and, on the other hand, the form of the organization, be it integration through full ownership or inter-firm linkages through strategic technology alliances [19, 22] . It is found that environments that induce or require a large degree of learning and flexibility, such as high-tech industries, will see prevalence for alliances, whereas mergers and acquisitions are dominant in the low-tech sectors of industry. Extending the logic to the governance of reverse logistics, we can similarly expect that the outsourcing of reverse logistics is preferred in high-tech industries. From the above framework, the rationale for outsourcing in high-tech industries include both the higher benefits from a more flexible governance mode which facilitate the value creation in collaboration as well as lower external cost due to the flexibility of outsourcing. In particular, as the time value of a returned high-tech product is relatively high, a reverse supply chain that can get returned products quickly tested for either resale or remanufacture would be valuable. An efficient reverse supply chain governed by a 3PL which can recover the value of returned products significantly would have clear advantage over a selfmanaged supply chain.
On the other hand, under the conditions of little technological change, companies demonstrate a preference for formal and well institutionalized modes of organization and control to be the most appropriate form of external appropriation of innovative capabilities. In the context of reverse logistics, a self-managed supply chain would be preferred as control over relational costs would be more important compared to the benefits from a more flexible supply chain. Hence: These propositions may explain the prevalence of the engagement of 3PLs in reverse logistics by high-tech firms. Facing high external uncertainty, passing the risky spare parts management to 3PLs would help the high-tech firms focus on their core competencies. Due to fierce competition in the market, manufacturers have to set very liberal return policies which increase the value of return products further [2] . An efficient return and recycle process would be valuable and professional 3PLs can meet perfectly such needs.
B. Profitability Differences in the Preferences for Selfgovernance and Outsourcing
In a normal organizational mode choice, firms would prefer M&As for activities in their core business as they would generate the necessary controls [22] . In the context of reverse logistics, the core business factor could be translated to the profitability of the reverse supply chain compared to the overall firm profitability. A core business would be the main source of revenue and profit for a company and is thus more important to be protected from the potential loss of capabilities due to the opportunistic behavior of partners. Here control is more important than flexibility as well as potential benefits from collaboration with external partners. Similarly, a reverse supply chain should be controlled by the manufacturer if it is the main source of profit. Leaving the management to externals would be highly risky and dangerous. Applying our framework, the relational costs of outsourcing a highly profitable supply chain would be extremely high. Selfmanagement would be more appropriate. However, for a reverse supply chain with little profit or even losing money, it is natural for the manufacturer to pass the governance duty to external parties. Hence:
Proposition 2a: For companies whose profits are largely from reverse logistics, the self-governance of a reverse supply chain is preferred as a mechanism for better control. Proposition 2b: For companies whose profits from reverse logistics are little compared to other sources, the outsourcing of a reverse supply chain is preferred as a mechanism for better efficiency.
These propositions may explain the significant differences in reverse logistics governance between the automotive and aerospace industries while both industries are similar in product characteristics, supply chain structure, and have high demand for spare parts management. Both products are complex and require high engineering and manufacturing capabilities, and both can easily be broken down into major modules and systems. Both supply chains have a large base of suppliers organized in several tiers (part manufacturers, system integrators to sub-assembly suppliers) who supply to relatively few manufacturers. Both product lives are relatively long with strong demand for maintenance and spare parts and the service quality of reverse logistics is essential for the manufacturers [23] .
While the outsourcing of reverse logistics is common in the aerospace industry [5] , car manufacturers largely operate spare parts management by themselves. A key difference between the two industries is the profit margin of reverse logistics. Automotive manufacturers face steep competition, low growth, and a saturated mass market. The profit margin is very low, (the profit from selling new cars is typically less than 5%). On the other hand, the spare parts market enjoys a much higher margin and is an important source of profits for manufacturers. Though the task of managing thousands of different parts across hundreds of car models is challenging, the profit motivation is strong enough for manufacturers to invest and manage the reverse supply chain themselves. On the contrary, the manufacturers of aircrafts are still enjoying high profit from the limited competition and the technological advantage of incumbents like Boeing and Airbus is not likely to lose in the near future. According to the clockspeed theory, the aerospace industry is one of the slowest industries in industrial environment change [24] . Hence, it is logical for these manufacturers to pass the spare parts management to capable 3PLs.
C. Pooling Ability
Reverse logistics is less standardized compared to the forward supply chain. Goods are less likely to be shipped in high volumes, and demand is more difficult to predict. Thus, the cost of managing reverse logistics is often higher than that of the forward supply chain. The pooling ability of the chain governor would be one important aspect of its capabilities and affect supply chain cost significantly. It can increase relative benefits in the transaction value analysis framework.
In the governance of a forward supply chain, Li & Fung is a typical supply chain governor. It is a Hong Kong-based company which serves private label apparel firms in Europe and North America, and is known to operate as a "smokeless" factory by maintaining a large network of suppliers even though it does not own any factory. By using its buying power and trust developed with its supply base, Li & Fung is able to considerably shrink the delivery cycle of time sensitive products [25] . The pooling effect is important in the supply chain management of Li & Fung, which keeps a rule of having at least 30% but not more than 70% business from a specific supplier to ensure sufficient leverage for supplier compliance but still keep its independence [25] . However, different from leveraging as power in the forward supply chain, pooling in reverse logistics is more cost centered as it could significantly lower the supply chain cost. 3PLs thus often enjoy advantage over manufacturers as they are able to consolidate shipping orders from multiple manufacturers. Hence:
The stronger the pooling ability held by the third party over the manufacturer in reverse logistics, the more suitable it is for the third party to manage the reverse supply chain.
A corollary from Proposition 3 is that small manufacturers are more likely to engage 3PLs (or large firms but having a small customer base in a region) while large firms would prefer to self manage the reverse supply chain.
D. Regulatory Uncertainty
In contrast to a forward supply chain where the market force is the main external factor, the hands of governmental regulation are much more visible in reverse logistics. With increasing environmental awareness, governments, particularly those in developed countries, are pressing manufacturers and distributors to reduce the production of environmentally hazardous products and packages [3] . For example, regulations on End-of-life Vehicles (ELV) Directive adopted by the European Union (EU) in 2000 have motivated manufacturers like Volvo, Saab, and BMW to redesign their cars so that their components can be dismantled more efficiently [3] .
New government regulations can change the rule of the game significantly, and manufacturers have to comply to participate in the marketplace and often need to redesign their products and packaging to meet these requirements. Both forward and reverse supply chains could be affected and reverse supply chains tend to be exposed to greater regulatory uncertainty. Thus, the manufacturer must take the potential governmental intervention into consideration in the choice between selfgovernance and outsourcing. According to our framework, high external costs would lead to a preference for outsourcing. Hence:
Proposition 4:
The stronger the regulatory uncertainty in the industry within a region, the more suitable it is for a third party to manage the reverse supply chain.
Regions such as the EU where governments tend to be global leaders for new environmental regulation face greater regulatory uncertainty. According to Proposition 5, manufacturers in industries with significant outputs of environmentally hazardous materials should outsource their reverse logistics in such regions.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a framework to examine the governance mode of reverse logistics. Drawing on perspectives from multiple organizational theories, we develop a general framework on the governance mode choice considering net transaction value which reflects relative benefits, relational costs and external costs. Applying the framework to the context of reverse logistics, we have generated four sets of propositions. These propositions can explain some phenomena observed in various practices, and can be further investigated empirically. While the findings in this paper are preliminary, it suggests that the most appropriate governance mode for a reverse supply chain depends on the context of that chain.
